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SECURITIES REGULATION AND ANTITRUST LAWS-IMPLIED REPEAL OF
TiE ANTITRUST LAWS WITH RESPECT 'TO PRACTICES OF THE SECURI-
TIES INDUSTRY-ACTIVE SEC REVIEW OR PERVASIVE REGULATORY
SCHEME SUFFICIENT TO IMPLY IMMUNITY-Gordon v. New.York Stock
Exchange, 95 S. Ct. 2598 (1975); United States v. National Ass'n of
Securities Dealers, 95 S. Ct. 2427 (1975).
In United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,'
and in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,2 the Supreme Court was
asked to find certain anticompetitive practices in the securities market
violative of the federal antitrust laws.3 While the challenged practices
had not been granted an express congressional exemption from the
provisions of the Sherman Act,4 the Court, applying the doctrine of
implied repeal, held that the market restrictions were immune from
antitrust proscriptions. 5 Under the doctrine of implied repeal the Court
looks to the legislative history of a particular act in order to determine
whether it can be inferred that Congress, in passing the act, intended to
grant an exemption from the federal antitrust laws., In Gordon and
NASD the Court was thus presented with the task of determining which
legislative enactment, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act) 7 or
the antitrust legislation, was intended by Congress to be paramount.8
1. 95 S. Ct. 2427 (1975).
2. 95 S. Ct. 2598 (1975).
3. United States v. NASD, 95 S. Ct. 2427, 2435 (1975); Gordon v. NYSE, 95 S. Ct.
2598, 2601 (1975).
4. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), provides in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ....
The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), provides in part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor [sic] ....
5. United States v. NASD, 95 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (1975); Gordon v. NYSE, 95 S. Ct.
2598, 2615 (1975).
6. United States v. NASD, 95 S. Ct. 2427, 2435-40 (1975); Gordon v. NYSE, 95 S.
Ct. 2598, 2602-04 (1975).
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78a et seq. (Supp. IV, 1975).
8. See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1963).
The difficult problem here arises from the need to reconcile pursuit of the antitrust
aim of eliminating restraints on competition with the effective operation of a public
policy contemplating that securities exchanges will engage in self-regulation which
may well have anticompetitive effects in general and in specific applications.
Id.
RECENT DECISIONS
I. IMPLIED REPEAL AND REGULATORY AGENCIES
Because of the hybrid nature of regulatory agencies and the broad
powers vested in them,9 these agencies have often invoked the doctrine
of implied repeal in an attempt to immunize their actions from liability
under the Sherman Act.10 In such cases the court focuses on the
legislative history of the particular agency's enabling legislation in order
to determine whether -the powers vested in the agency were designed
to create "a pervasive legislative scheme"'' or if an express power was
intended to supplant the antitrust laws.' 2 If such a scheme or express
delegation of power exists, the court will grant an implied exemption
from the antitrust laws.
Generally the courts consider several factors when making a determi-
nation of whether implied repeal is to be granted. Among the more
prominent are: (1) whether the transaction is pursuant to the agency's
authority; (2) whether the agency's authority has been exercised; (3)
the extent of the powers granted to the agency by Congress; (4) the
nature of the conflict between the enabling legislation of the agency and
the antitrust legislation; and (5) whether immunization must be granted
to insure that the agency's purposes can be fulfilled.' 3
It is possible that Congress did not anticipate conflicts between the federal antitrust
laws and the regulatory statutes or that they were reluctant to grant an express immunity
from antitrust laws because of the strong national interest favoring antitrust policy.
9. These agencies possess executive, judicial and legislative powers in varying degrees.
J. WIESEN, REGULATING TRANSACTIONS IN SEcUnrrins 3 (1975). For example, an exami-
nation of the SEC's activities reveals that through releases, no-action letters, review of
rules and regulations of exchanges and associations, requests of Congress for legislation,
and the institution of suits, the SEC exercises powers that overlap the activities of all
three branches of government. Id. at 4.
10. See cases cited at note 13 infra.
11. United States v. NASD, 95 S. Ct. 2427,2435 (1975).
12. Gordon v. NYSE, 95 S. Ct. 2598, 2614-15 (1975).
13. In utilizing these factors, the Supreme Court has granted implied immunity in only
two cases involving an agency other than the SEC. Both of these involved actions of the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 296 (1963), the Court held that the CAB must consider competition and
monopolistic aspects when reviewing unfair competitive practices in transactions, and,
because these are two important elements of the antitrust statutes, acquisitions given
CAB approval were immune from antitrust liability. Contra, e.g., California v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 486 (1962); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 351
(1959) (regulatory agencies statutorily mandated to follow the standard of "public
interest and necessity" when approving and overseeing industry conduct not granted
implied immunity).
Cases in which the Court has dealt with and denied implied repeal fall within three
broad categories:
I. In those cases in which the activity under consideration was determined to be
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The securities industry has had more success than other industries in
invoking the doctrine of implied repeal. 14 The self-regulatory nature of
outside the scope of agency authority, the Court concluded no congressional intent could
be found to imply repeal of the antitrust laws. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439
(1945).
II. The second category consists of cases in which the particular rule or transaction
was within the scope of regulatory agency authority but was not exempt from antitrust
liability. After determining the transaction was within the scope of agency authority, the
Court was unable to find a scheme which was so pervasive that it would support implied
repeal.
Two cases involving the Federal Power Commission (FPC) reveal that the FPC has a
grant of authority for specific aspects of the industry, but lacks a "pervasive regulatory
scheme" over the industry as a whole. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973), involved the refusal of a power company to install interconnections between
itself and a municipal power company. The FPC could order interconnections; however,
this power was limited to those situations where a company refused to voluntarily
interconnect when in the public interest. This authority was so limited as to negate the
possibility of any pervasive regulatory scheme inconsistent with antitrust liability.
Accord, California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
In other cases, the Court has found no immunization because, although a scheme may
be present, there were clear and specific indications against immunization in the
legislative intent. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the
Court noted that, while the Comptroller of the Currency has the power to approve
bank mergers and, in so doing, to consider competitive factors, the Comptroller is not
required to give any particular weight to these factors. But see United States v. Citizens
S. Nat'l Bank, 95 S. Ct. 2099 (1975); United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S.
656 (1974); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). In light
of a clear legislative intent not to repeal the antitrust laws here, such mergers were held
subject to antitrust liability. Similarly, transactions between television stations, although
subject to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approval, were held not immune
from antitrust liability in United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959). This holding was
supported by clear and specific indications to the contrary appearing in the regulatory
statute governing the FCC and in the legislative reports preceding its enactment.
I. Finally, there are cases in which regulatory authority to supervise the activity
under consideration existed but was not exercised. These cases stand for the proposition
that the participation and affirmative approval of the agency creates exemption, but
without that participation no justification exists for removing commercial transactions
from the restrictions of the basic antitrust policy. In Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound
Conference, 383 U.S. 213, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966), acts establishing rates
between shippers which were not submitted for Federal Maritime Commission scrutiny
and approval were not held to be immune from antitrust liability even though the
Commission had the power to exempt such agreements from antitrust statutes through
its affirmative approval. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939), involved
milk distributors, producers and municipal officials who were charged with violation of
the antitrust laws arising from certain agreements regarding production, distribution and
marketing of milk. The Court held that neither the Agriculture Marketing Agreement
Act nor the Capper-Volstead Act, both of which allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to
immunize various types of price agreements including the type at issue in the case,
applied to agreements made without the participation and approval of the Secretary.
14. See J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc. v. Haack, 387 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(immunity given to exchange disciplinary action per rule 19(b)); Abbot Sec. Corp.
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the securities industry has inherent antitrust tendencies15 and, though
the securities laws are designed to protect public investors, the laws
themselves recognize the near-monopolistic position of the securities
exchanges.' 6 Hence, the regulatory scheme intended by Congress for. the
securities industry exists against a backdrop of certain anticompetitive
characteristics which may be necessary for the well-being of the indus-
try.' 7 Though this scheme cannot be carried out "in a fundamentally
unfair manner,"'18 the SEC has been given liberal authority in areas
specifically or impliedly within its jurisdiction.' 9
11. THE JuDICLAL UNDERPINNINGS
The necessary prerequisite for analysis of Gordon and NASD is Silver
v. NYSE. 20 In that case, the New York Stock Exchange (the Exchange)
ordered ten of its member firms to sever private wire connections with
petitioners who were nonmembers functioning in the over-the-counter
securities market. 2 ' The discontinuance of these connections caused
substantial losses in revenue for one firm and the cessation of the other's
business.22 The Exchange did not provide the petitioners with reasons
v. NYSE, 384 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1974) (immunity given to nonmember minimum
commission schedule and rebate prohibition); Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs.,
Inc., 286 F. Supp. 914 (1968), affd, 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969) (commission rate
structure held not to be a per se antitrust violation); Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers, 250 F.
Supp. 562 (1966), affd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967)
(immunity given to change and alter fixed rates of commission).
15. See generally Nerenberg, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities
Field, 16 WEsT. Ris. L. Rav. 131 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Nerenberg].
16. See generally id.; Johnson, Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities In-
dustry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
17. Johnson, supra note 16, at 536-37. The fundamental near-monopolistic powers of
the New York Stock Exchange are
the maintenance of a minimum commission schedule; the imposition of various pro-
hibitions designed to restrict multiple trading in listed securities; and the utilization
of a restrictive set of membership requirements, designed to control entry into the
market.
Id.
18. Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 364 (1963).
19. See cases cited note 14 supra.
20. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
21. Id. at 344. Petitioners were proprietors of two companies, Municipal Securities
(dealing primarily in municipal bonds) and Municipal Securities, Inc., (trading in over-
the-counter securities). Both firms were registered with the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. The private wire connections (direct wire telephone connections
and a stock ticker service) had been temporarily approved by the Exchange but were
ordered removed pursuant to Art. XIV, § 17 of the Exchange's Constitution and Rules.
373 U.S. at 343-44; see id. at 354 n.9.
22. 373 U.S. at 344-45.
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for, or advance notice of, its actions or with an opportunity to be
heard.28
The Court reviewed Silver's complaint which alleged violations of the
Sherman Act and sought injunctive relief and treble damages, among
other remedies. Noting that the Exchange's severance of private wire
lines was not expressly exempted from, and in view of its adverse effect
on competition would therefore be a per se violation of the Sherman
Act,2" the Court pursued the issue of whether the Exchange's actions
23. Id. at 344, 361, 364-65. Reasons were not afforded petitioners at the time the
Exchange ordered the severance of private wire connections. Furthermore, no opportuni-
ty to reply was given. The Court concluded that no policy of the Act was served by
denial of notice and opportunity to be heard. The purpose of self-regulation is to protect
investors and to promote fair dealing; this is lost when an exchange wields such
"tremendous economic power without explaining its basis for acting. . . ." Id. at 361.
In addition to the general impetus to refrain from making unsupportable accusations
that is present when it is required that the basis of the charges be laid bare, the
explanation or rebuttal offered by the nonmember will in many instances dissipate
the force of the ex parte information upon which an exchange proposes to act. The
duty to explain and afford an opportunity to answer will. . . be of extremely bene-
ficial effect in keeping exchange action from straying into areas wholly foreign to
the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act. And, given the possibility of antitrust
liability for anticompetitive acts of self-regulation which fall too far outside the
scope of the Exchange Act, the utilization of a notice and hearing procedure with
its inherent check upon unauthorized exchange action will diminish rather than en-
large the likelihood that such liability will be incurred and hence will not interfere
with the Exchange's ability to engage efficaciously in legitimate substantive self-
regulation.. .. [Tihe affording of procedural safeguards not only will sub-
stantively encourage the lessening of anticompetitive behavior outlawed by the Sher-
man Act but will allow the antitrust court to perform its function effectively.
Id. at 362-63 (footnote omitted). See also Zuckerman v. Yount, 362 F. Supp. 858 (N.D.
Ill. 1973) (procedural due process is merely threshold justification for exemption from
antitrust laws and does not necessarily indicate antitrust immunity).
24. 373 U.S. at 347. "The Securities Exchange Act contains. no express exemption
from the antitrust laws or, for that matter, from any other statute." Id. at 357.
Certain acts are expressly exempted from application of the antitrust laws. Cf. Capper-
Volstead Act (Agricultural Prod. Producers Ass'n Act), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970);
Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970) (for an interpretation see United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963)); Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1970); Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970) (export trade);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (n), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-
3(n) (Supp. IV, 1975) (over-the-counter markets); Fisheries Co-operative Marketing
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 522 (1970); Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. (1970);
Insurance Moratorium Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1970); Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §
814 (1970); Merchant Marine Act, 46 U.S.C. § 885(b) (1970); Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. H9 221(a), 222(c) (1) (1970); Interstate Commerce Act,
Part 1, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1970); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1348
(1970).
Even where there is an express exemption, the administrative agency is generally
required to take competitive factors into account. See, e.g., United States v. ICC, 396
U.S. 491 (1970); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Line, 390
U.S. 238 (1968); Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967);
Minneapolis & S.L.R.R. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959); McLean Trucking Co. v.
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were impliedly immune from the operation of the antitrust laws.2 5
Recognizing that implied repeal is not favored,2 6 the Court stated:
"Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the
Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum
extent necessary. ' 27 The Court found that the Exchange's order to its
members demanding that they summarily sever their private line con-
nections with nonmembers could not, under the above test, be granted
implied immunity.
The Court's decision was based on the SEC's inability to review the
Exchange's order. The 1934 Act specifically provided individual stock
exchanges with the opportunity to regulate themselves by adopting and
enforcing rules not inconsistent with that act.28 Additionally, the SEC
was given the power to request the exchanges to make changes in their
rules, and, impliedly, to disapprove any rules adopted by an exchange.2 9
United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970);
Interstate Commerce Act, Part 1, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (c) (1970).
Under other statutes there is no express exemption, but the administrative agency is
required to assess competitive effects in determining whether a particular transaction is
in the public interest. See, e.g., Savings and Loan Holding Co. Amendments of 1967, 12
U.S.C. § 1730 (1970); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1970).
Moreover, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Silver Court
found:
The absence of Commission jurisdiction, besides defining the limits of the in-
quiry, contributes to its solution. There is nothing built into the regulatory scheme
which performs the antitrust function of insuring that an exchange will not in some
cases apply its rules so as to do injury to competition which cannot be justified as
furthering legitimate self-regulative ends. By providing no agency check on ex-
change behavior in particular cases, Congress left the regulatory scheme subject to
"the influences of ... [improper collective action] over which the Commission has
no authority but which if proven to exist can only hinder the Commission in the
tasks with which it is confronted,".
373 U.S. at 358-59 (citations omitted).
25. 373 U.S. at 357.
26. Id.; see United States v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, 95 S. Ct. 2427, 2443
(1975); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973);
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973); Hughes Tool Co. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch.,
409 U.S. 289, 303 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S.
213 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348, 350 (1963);
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963); California v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334,
350 (1959); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945); United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
27. 373 U.S. at 357.
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78f (Supp. IV, 1975) (necessity for regulation). See El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp.,
494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1974).
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78s (Supp. IV, 1975).
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However, the Commission was not given the power to review the
enforcement of exchange rules which formed the basis of Silver's ac-
tion.
80
The Court found that since it was not the purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act to deprive individuals of procedural safeguards in the
form of notice and a hearing, it could not be said that repeal was
"necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work." 1 The Court
expressly withheld an opinion as to what standard of review would have
been applied to the anticompetitive practices challenged in Silver had
there been the possibility of review by the Commission.
Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for
scrutiny of a particular exchange ruling, as there is under the 1938 Ma-
loney Act amendments to the Exchange Act to examine disciplinary ac-
tion by a registered securities association (i.e., by the NASD), a differ-
ent case would arise concerning exemption from the operation of laws
designed to prevent anticompetitive activity .... 32
30. 373 U.S. at 357. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (Supp. IV, 1975). See also 2 Loss, SECURrrIES REGULATION
1178 (2d ed. 1961).
The Court also alluded to the issue of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine involves
deferring a matter to a supervisory agency for its expertise before the court decides the
case. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289,
305-06 (1973) (administrative jurisdiction necessary where membership transferred in
violation of Commodity Exchange Act); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S.
570, 574-75 (1952); United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S., 284 U.S. 474 (1932)
(Shipping Board had exclusive jurisdiction to consider petitioner's antitrust complaint);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
The Court in Silver recognized the absence of jurisdiction by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Even if the Court wanted to defer the matter to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, that Commission was not empowered, by statute or rule, to
hear the matter. 373 U.S. at 358. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
It should be noted that after the Commission has acted on a particular measure, there
is a procedure for judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 702, 704 (1970), or, in the case of final commission orders, under the provisions of 15
U.S.C.A. § 78y (Supp. IV, 1975). Under this latter provision, the Court of Appeals is
more severely restricted than in cases of review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
See Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Independent Broker-Dealers'
Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971). On
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, see 3 K. DAviS, ADMINIsmrnvn, LAw TREATISE, ch. 19
(1958); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L RaV. 1037 (1964); King, The "Argua-
bly Lawful" Test of Primary Jurisdiction in Antitrust Litigation Involving Regulated
Industries, 40 T"INN. L. Rlv. 617 (1973); Note, Primary Jurisdiction in Antitrust Action
Against the New York Stock Exchange: Immunization and Expertise, 1970 U. ILL. L.F.
544.
31. 373 U.S. at 364-65.
32. Id. at 358 n.12 (citations omitted).
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Thus whether an express provision for SEC review would be sufficient
to allow implied repeal of the antitrust laws, or whether a factual
examination would have to be made to determine if an implied repeal
was necessary to make the securities laws work, was left unanswered.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined this question
in Thill Securities Corp. v. NYSE." The plaintiff in Thill challenged, on
antitrust grounds, the Exchange's "antirebate rule" which prohibited
any member from sharing a commission with a nonmember.14 The fact
that the rule in question might be subject to review by the SEC under
section 19(b)(9) was found insufficient to sustain a finding of implied
repeal.33 The court stated that even if the rule were expressly subject
to SEC review an analysis under Silver would still be necessary.36
Less than three years prior to Thill, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers,87 was presented with a
fact situation similar to that in Gordon in that it concerned the SEC's
power under section 19(b)(9) to "alter or supplement the rules of such
exchange . . . in respect of such matters as . . . the fixing of reason-
able rates of commission."38 The court held that the mere finding
33. 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
34. Id. at 266-67.
35. Id. at 270. The court expressed skepticism as to the necessity of the rule. The rule
was applied somewhat arbitrarily depending upon the economics of the situation in
dealings between member and nonmember brokerage firms. Id. at 274.
36. Id. at 269; see text accompanying note 27 supra. The case was therefore remanded
to the district court for determination of: (1) whether the antirebate rule was in fact
subject to SEC review; (2) whether the "regulatory scheme 'performs the antitrust
function' "; (3) whether, under Silver, the antirebate rule was necessary to make the
Securities Exchange Act work in light of its application by some exchanges but not by
others; and (4) what the ultimate effects of the antirebate rule would be upon
competition. Id. at 270.
37. 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
38. Id. at 411. The appellate court in Thill recognized the direct review power
of the SEC in Kaplan as contrasted to the SEC's possible review of the antirebate
rule in Thill. However, the Thill court was not ready to recognize SEC review power,
standing alone, as being sufficient to constitute antitrust immunity. Rather, the court
took issue with the district court's application of Kaplan, stating that the analysis did not
end once the court determined that the SEC did have the power of review over the
complained of Exchange practice. Rather the court demanded a consideration under
Silver to determine if the Exchange practice, (fixing of commission rates) was in fact
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and that that practice was being
used to the minimum extent necessary. 433 F.2d at 268-69.
The Thill court expressed this finding as follows: ". .. we find in the teachings of
Silver, no 'intimation' that the mere possibility of SEC review wraps the conduct of the
Exchange in an impregnable shield of antitrust immunity." Id. at 269.
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of SEC review power under this section necessarily implied antitrust
immunity.39
Against this judicial background the Supreme Court in Gordon and
NASD was given the opportunity to clarify the proper application of
Silver.
M. GORDON v. NYSE
In Gordon, the petitioner, individually and on behalf of an asserted
class of small investors, filed suit in federal district court against the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), and two member firms.40 Gordon claimed that the ex-
changes' practices of fixing commission rates41 for transactions of less
than $500,000 violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.42 Grant-
ing respondents' motion for summary judgment, the district court found
that it
lack[ed the] jurisdiction to entertain an anti-trust attack on the commis-
sion structure of the Exchanges, since the fixing of commissions falls
39. 371 F.2d at 410-11.
40. Gordon v. NYSE, 366 F. Supp. 1261, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a! 'd, 498 F.2d 1303
(2d Cir. 1974), affd, 95 S. Ct. 2598 (1975). The two member firms were Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Bache & Company, Inc.
41. Price fixing has been held a per se violation of the Sherman Act. United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927). See, e.g., United States v. National
Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950) (services, as well as goods, are
subject to the Sherman Act); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
218 (1940).
42. 95 S. Ct. at 2601. Only transactions greater than $500,000 were open to competi-
tive commission rates at the time this suit was filed. Id. at 2606.
Other challenges to the exchanges' practices were directed at: (1) volume discount
rates given to transactions of greater than 1,000 shares and the existence of negotiated
rather than fixed rates for transactions in excess of $500,000; (2) rules limiting the
number of exchange memberships; and (3) rules denying discounted commission rates to
nonmembers using exchange facilities. Gordon v. NYSE, 366 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 2598 (1975).
The district court found the Robinson-Patman Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1970), inapplicable to petitioner's challenge to volume discount rates and negoti-
ated rather than fixed rates. That act only applied to commodities; shares did not
constitute commodities. 366 F. Supp. at 1263. The Supreme Court agreed. 95 S. Ct. 2601
& nn.2-4. See, e.g., Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 409 F.2d 872, 876 (7th
Cir. 1969). As to petitioner's challenge to the limitation on exchange memberships the
district court found that he lacked the requisite standing because he had never applied
for an exchange membership. 366 F. Supp. at 1263. Finally, with respect to the last
challenge, the court found inherent in the term "member" as defined by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (3), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a) (3)
(Supp. IV, 1975), that nonmember access to the exchanges was to be limited. 366 F.
Supp. at 1263.
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squarely within the congressional policy of exchange self-regulation em-
bodied in the 1934 Act.
43
Recognizing that the 1934 Act expressly directed the SEC to supervise
the "fixing of reasonable rates of commission,"44 the court believed that
it was presented with the "different case" on which Silver reserved
decision, "where review of exchange self-regulation [would be available]
'through a vehicle other than the anti-trust laws.' "45
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court.40 It based its holding upon: (1) the express statutory
authorization of the SEC to fix reasonable rates of commission;4 7 (2)
the legislative history of the Act, i.e., Congress knowing that price fix-
ing was illegal per se, nonetheless afforded the SEC power to fix
reasonable rates of commission; 4s and (3) the need for exchange self-
regulation,49 while not subjecting the exchange to conflicting stand-
ards. 0 In light of the additional factor that the SEC had exercised its
supervisory power over the exchanges with respect to the fixing of rea-
sonable rates of commission, the court concluded that antitrust im-
munity was proper.5 '
The Supreme Court, in granting certiorari,5 was thus presented with
the opportunity to adopt either Thill's application of Silver (i.e., whether
the anticompetitive practice involved was necessary to make the Securi-
ties Exchange Act work), the Kaplan approach (i.e., an express power
43. Id. at 1264.
44. Id.; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (9), as amended,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b) (Supp. IV, 1975).
45. 366 F. Supp. at 1264, quoting Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
46. 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974), afr'd, 95 S. Ct. 2598 (1975).
47. Id. at 1305-06.
48. Id. at 1307; see note 41 supra.
49. Id. at 1307, 1309-10; see Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963).
The intention was .. . one of "letting the exchanges take the leadership with the
Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the
hope it would never have to be used."
Id. at 352, quoting W.O. DouGLAs, DEMocRAcY mD FNANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940).
50. 498 F.2d at 1307.
51. Id. at 1309-10.
52. 419 U.S. 1018 (1974). It might be intimated that the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari due to the apparent conflict existing among lower federal courts.
Compare Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971); Fredrickson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 389 F. Supp.
1151 (N.D. Ill. 1974), with Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), .cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967); Abbott Sec. v. NYSE, 384 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1974);
Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.
1975). See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
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of review standing alone would be sufficient to grant implied repeal), or
to formulate another approach.53 The Gordon Court concluded that
there was an implied repeal of the antitrust laws with respect to the
fixing of commission rates.54 Three factors were relied upon: (1) there
was a congressional intent that the SEC have the power to review, alter,
and supplement commission rates under section 19(b)(9); 51 (2) that
power was being actively exercised by the SEC;58 and (3) in light of
Silver, the express statutory authority given to the SEC under section
19(b) (9) itself signified that the rule was necessary to make the Act
work.
5r
In so holding, the Court distinguished Thill on two grounds.5 8 First,
whereas there was no evidence of SEC review as to the "antirebate rule"
in Thill, the NYSE and AMEX in Gordon presented considerable evi-
dence of actual SEC review and regulation of commission rates." Sec-
ond, the Court noted that the "antirebate rule" was not enumerated under
section 19(b) as was the power to fix reasonable rates of commis-
sion. Furthermore, the "antirebate rule" was not applied consistently as
was the fixing of rates of commission, but was applied arbitrarily. Most
importantly, however, the Court noted that the question of implied
53. It would seem that the Second Circuit in Gordon, 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974),
chose a variation of the Kaplan approach. In addition to recognizing SEC power of
review under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 19(b) (9), as amended,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (Supp. IV, 1975), the circuit court in Gordon affirmed the congres-
sional policy that
those matters [are] fundamental to achieving "the aims of the Securities Exchange
Act" . . . and accorded the SEC the authority to make whatever changes respecting
those matters that are "necessary or appropriate" . . . to effectuate those aims-
i.e., in the terms of the Silverjtest, "necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act
work."
498 F.2d at 1306. Thus one could surmise that the court took the position that any
express statutory power given to the SEC such as set forth in § 19(b), had the effect of
satisfying Silver, as long as that power was being exercised by the SEC. Id. at 1307-09.
In contrast to the circuit court in Gordon, Thill required a finding that the express
statutory provision, if one existed, was necessary to make the Exchange Act work.
Insofar as Thill refused to extend antitrust immunity upon a mere showing of SEC
review, it is consistent with the lower court in Gordon. However, Gordon differs from
Thill with respect to the quantum of additional evidence necessary to sustain implied
immunity. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text. This was reflected when the
appellate court in Gordon stated: "Thus, to the extent our decision today is inconsistent
with Thill, we find ourselves constrained to disagree with the holding there announced."
Id. at 1310.
54. 95 S. Ct. at 2615.
55. Id. at 2602-04.
56. Id. at 2604-11.
57. Id. at 2612-13.
58. Id. at 2613-14. See notes 36 & 38 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 72 infra and accompanying text.
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repeal was not one of fact as to whether the particular rule in ques-
tion was necessary to make the Act work; rather, it was a question of
law as to whether "allowance of an antitrust suit would conflict with the
operation of the regulatory scheme which specifically authorizes the
SEC to oversee the fixing of commission rates." 60
The Court also distinguished its decision in Ricci v. Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange."1 In that case, the respondent commodity exchange trans-
ferred the petitioner's membership without hearing or notice. Ricci
alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act,62 the particular rule
of the Exchange, 63 and the Sherman Act, in that the Exchange action
was part of a conspiracy aimed at restraining the conduct of petitioner's
business.64 Although the Court recognized Ricci as the "different case"
of which Silver spoke,65 it declined to decide the question of antitrust
immunity. Instead, it stayed proceedings in the federal court until the
Commodity Exchange Commission made a factual determination of
whether the actions complained of were in conformity with the Com-
modity Exchange Act and the Exchange rules.66 Only after such a
determination could the Court appropriately decide whether there was
an implied repeal of the antitrust laws.
The Gordon case did not present a situation requiring a factual
determination of whether the actions complained of were in conformity
with the Securities Exchange Act and the exchange rules. The Court
recognized that the Securities and Exchange Commission and the ex-
changes were acting pursuant to their statutory authority under the Act,
and a factual determination of such conformity was unnecessary.
67
In light of a long history of exchange self-regulation prior to enact-
ment of the 1934 Act,68 the Court found an intent by Congress that such
self-regulation should continue under the Act, subject to SEC supervi-
60. 95 S. Ct. at 2613.
61. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
62. Id. at 290-91.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 302. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
66. 409 U.S. at 302. The Court remanded the case for three different reasons:
first, to determine whether the Commodity Exchange Act or any of its provisions
were inconsistent with an action brought under the antitrust laws; second, to de-
termine whether the Commodity Exchange Commission would have statutory jurisdic-
tion to consider aspects of the dispute between petitioner Ricci and the respondent; and
third, whether the Exchange was acting within its statutory authority when it transferred
Ricci's membership. Id.
67. 95 S. Ct. at 2614.
68. Id. at 2602-03.
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sion. 0 As the Court concluded: "Supervised self-regulation, although
consonant with the traditional private governance of exchanges, allows
the Government to monitor exchange business in the public interest."7 0
The Court found evidence of this policy of supervised self-regulation in
Section 19(b)(9) which in the first instance left the fixing of commis-
sion rates to the exchange but subject to the SEC's power to "alter or
supplement" as it determined "necessary or appropriate for the protec-
tion of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities .... "'
The Court further noted the active role which the SEC had actually
taken with regard to the fixing of reasonable commission rates. The
fifteen year period preceding the Court's decision was replete with
instances of SEC investigation of existing exchange fixed commission
rates, changes of those commission rates, and promulgation of new
rates. 71 While that history was marred by instances of congressional
disapproval of SEC progress in review and regulation, 3 Congress had
"generally been content to allow the SEC to proceed without new
legislation. ' 4
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2604, quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 414 U.S. 117,
127-28 (1973), where the Court noted two types of regulation in the 1934 Act. On the
one hand there are direct requirements and prohibitions, i.e., registration requirements,
and on the other, self-regulatory provisions, i.e. fixing of commission rates.
71. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9), as amended, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78s (Supp. IV, 1975).
72. For example, in 1968 volume discounts were adopted by the NYSE and later by
the AMEX for transactions greater than 1,000 shares. In 1971 competitive rates were
adopted for transactions greater than $500,000. In April of 1972, the level was
reduced to $300,000. In 1974 the SEC allowed competitive rates on nonmember orders
below $2,000. Later in 1975 the SEC adopted rules prohibiting the fixing of commission
rates after May 1, 1975 for all nonmember transactions, and on May 1, 1976 for all
member transactions i.e. floor brokerage transactions. 95 S. Ct. at 2606-08.
73. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SunCOMM. ON
SECUITIES, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STuY REPORT, S. Doc. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., 5-7, 43-63 (1973); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HoUsING AND URBAN AFFIARS,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY REPORT INCLUDING REPORT OF THE
SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES 4 (Comm. Print 1972); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE, SECURITIES INDUSTRY
STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., XIX, 141, 144-45, 146 (1972);
Hearings on S. 3169 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also Baxter,
NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. REV. 675
(1970).
74. 95 S. Ct. at 2611. However, note the new legislation, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.
(Supp. IV, 1975), which in addition to codifying the SEC directive to prohibit the fixing
of commission rates, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(e) (Supp. IV, 1975), changes the procedures
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In the final part of the opinion, the Court distinguished Gordon from
Silver in terms of SEC review of exchange conduct. Whereas the SEC in
Silver did not have the power to review an application of an exchange
rule, Gordon presented the "different case" in which the SEC did have
the power under section 19(b)(9) to review the fixing of commission
rates by the exchanges. 75 The Court then concluded that due to the
SEC's direct supervisory power over the fixing of reasonable rates of
commission and the exercise of that power, along with continued con-
gressional approval, it was necessary to grant implied repeal "to make
the Act work as it was intended.
7 6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas recognized the three fac-
tors the majority had relied upon in reaching its decision, namely, the
SEC's statutory power of review, the SEC's use of that power, and
congressional support of the SEC's role.77 However, he emphasized that
the power of review, standing alone, would not immunize the ex-
changes from antitrust sanctions. He stated that the "active and aggres-
sive' use of SEC review, as was demonstrated by the record in Gor-
don,78 would be needed to insure that congressional intent to grant
immunity was satisfied with respect to fixing commission rates.79 This
active review was found lacking in NASD, thus serving as the basis for
a portion of the dissent in that case.
80
Justice Stewart, with whom Justice Brennan concurred, emphasized
congressional intent in affording the SEC the power of review under
section 19(b)(9) as the most important factor in finding implied repeal
of the antitrust laws.8 1 The Silver criteria would be satisfied by this mani-
festation of congressional intent rather than by the mere exercise of SEC
review power.
In finding implied repeal of the antitrust laws as applied to the ex-
changes' practices of fixing commission rates, the Gordon Court has
recognized the need for breathing space for these self-regulatory agen-
cies, whether or not the practice is "necessary to make the Securities
Exchange Act work."
with respect to SEC supervision over the rules of the exchanges, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s
(Supp. IV, 1975).
75. 95 S. Ct. at 2614.
76. Id. at 2615.
77. Id.
78. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
79. 95 S. Ct. at 2615.
80. See text accompanying note 117 infra.
81. 95 S. Ct. at 2615.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. NASD
In NASD the Court was not presented with a congressional delegation
of an express power of review as it was in Gordon. Rather, the existence
of a broad regulatory scheme was the basis for the claim of immunity.
In that case, the United States brought suit on behalf of investors
against members of the NASD,82 nonmember securities dealers and
mutual fund companies88 alleging that these parties, in violation of
federal antitrust laws,
84
combined and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices of mu-
tual fund shares in secondary market transactions between dealers, from
an investor to a dealer, and between investors through brokered transac-
tions. 85
The alleged practices, which were sanctioned by the NASD, created two
types of restrictions on the secondary market. First, vertical restrictions
were imposed by agreements between underwriters and broker-dealers
that compel[led] the maintenance of the public offering price in broker-
age transactions of specified mutual-fund shares, and that prohibit[ed]
interdealer transactions by allowing each broker-dealer to sell and
purchase shares only to or from investors.86
82. The National Association of Securities Dealers is a self-regulating association
comprised of broker-dealers and principal underwriters and is the only association
registered pursuant to section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act (the Maloney Act),
15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 780 (Supp. IV, 1975). In re Mutual
Funds Sales Litigation, 374 F. Supp. 95, 97 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in part sub nom.
United States v. NASD, 95 S. Ct. 2427 (1975). The NASD is authorized to prescribe
rules and regulations governing its members subject to SEC supervision. See generally the
Maloney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (Supp. IV,
1975).
83. A mutual fund is a particular form of investment company. The distinguishing
factor of an investment company security is that the sole assets of the issuer are in the
form of investments in other corporations. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 3(a), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1970).
Shares in the investment thus represent proportional interests in its investment port-
folio and their value fluctuates in relation to the changes in the value of the securi-
ties it owns.
United States v. NASD, 95 S. Ct. 2427, 2432 (1975). A mutual fund is an open-end
investment company, i.e., it is required by law to redeem its shares upon demand. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (32) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1970).
In order to avoid liquidation through redemption, mutual funds continuously issue
and sell new shares. These features--continuous and unlimited distribution and
compulsory redemption-are, as the Court recently recognized, "unique character-
istic[s]" of this form of investment.
United States v. NASD, 95 S. Ct. 2427, 2433 (1975).
84. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
85. 95 S. Ct. at 2433.
86. Id. at 2434.
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Second, a conspiracy to restrain trade arose from "an overall course of
conduct engaged in by the NASD and its members going beyond the
NASD's rule-making authority. 81 The practical effect of these restric-
tions was to establish a uniform price and a single market for each
mutual fund's shares. The NASD contended that these rules and activi-
ties were in pursuance of the statutory provisions of sections 22(d) and
22(f) of the Investment Company Act of 19408 (the Investment Act).
The district court89 accepted these contentions and dismissed the action
holding that a clear repugnancy existed between the practices authorized
by the Investment Act and the antitrust laws. The court stated:
It is ...apparent that Congress designed §§22(d) and 22(f) to create
and protect a primary distribution system which is repugnant to the anti-
trust laws and did so in complete recognition of the fact that the legisla-
tion would frustrate the growth of a free secondary market. That statu-
tory scheme is "incompatible with the maintenance of [an] antitrust
action."90
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's disposi-
tion, but disagreed in part with its substantive analysis. Before discus-
sing the specific provisions of sections 22(d) and 22(f), the Court ex-
amined the legislative history of the Investment Act.91 The Court con-
87. Id. at 2449 n.3; see id. at 2448 n.42.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1970).
89. In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, 374 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
affId in part sub nom. United States v. NASD, 95 S. Ct. 2427 (1975).
90. 374 F. Supp. at 109, quoting Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963). The court
also relied on the existence of a "pervasive statutory scheme" to justify implied repeal.
I]he fact that Congress clearly intended to substitute a pervasive regulatory scheme,
i.e., § 22 of the [Investment Act], for the usual antitrust prohibitions in the narrow
area of distribution and sale of mutual fund shares, [makes it] clear that the price
maintenance practices complained of are immune from ordinary antitrust strictures.
374 F. Supp. at 114 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). See note 115 infra.
However, recognizing that "antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic
policy" (id. at 113, quoting Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S.
213, 218 (1966)), the district court took care to note that it was "not holding] that the
Investment Company Act and the Maloney Act 'completely displace the antitrust laws.'"
Id. at 114, quoting Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363, 389 (1973).
91. The Investment Act was passed in recognition of the fact that the provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §
77a et seq. (Supp. IV, 1975) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a
et seq. (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq. (Supp. IV, 1975), were insufficient
to provide adequate protection for purchasers of investment company securities. Its
formulation was based largely on the Investment Trust Study (ITS). This report was
conducted when Congress directed the SEC to study problems endemic to the investment
company industry.
Part III of the ITS provided an analysis of the sales and distribution practices of
mutual funds prior to the passage of the Investment Company Act. The study noted that
discriminatory trading based on a "two-price system" within the secondary market
1975] 24t
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eluded that the Investment Act was passed to combat the disruptive
effect on the mutual funds market which arose from abuses within a
widespread secondary market.92 It was against this background that the
Court examined the particular practices alleged to be violative of the
antitrust laws.
A. Vertical Restrictions
The NASD contended initially that congressional sanction of the
vertical restrictions (i.e., the price maintenance agreements) could be
found in section 22(d)9" of the Investment Act which authorized price
maintenance in certain transactions. Accordingly, it was argued that, to
the extent Congress allowed such restrictive practices, it thereby intend-
ed the antitrust laws to be displaced and a corresponding immunity to be
granted the activities which comprised the vertical restrictions.94
The Court, however, found that the particular activities under consid-
eration extended beyond the scope of section 22(d). Although Congress
in enacting this section mandated maintenance of the public offering
price of mutual funds' securities in transactions between dealers or
underwriters and the investing public, the pricing agreements disputed
existed due to "riskless trading." This practice occurred when an investor had knowledge
of
the present day's trading price based on the portfolio value established the previous
day; and the following day's price, which was based on the net asset value
computed at the close of exchange trading on the present day.
95 S. Ct. at 2437. Those sophisticated investors who engaged in "two-price system"
trading were guaranteed the enjoyment of an instantaneous increase in the market value
of the investment. This immediate gain was concomitant with an equivalent dilution in
the value of the other outstanding shares. Inadequate explanations of the complex system
effectively precluded the investing public from utilizing or benefiting from this system,
even though information of the "two-price system" was available to the general public.
Id.
Based on an examination of this legislative history, the Court concluded:
Together, §§ 22(d) and 22(f) [of the Investment Company Act were enacted to]
protect the primary distribution system for mutual-fund securities. Section 22(d),
by eliminating price competition in dealer sales, inhibits the . . . [two-price trading
system] and thus assures the maintenance of a variable sales system. Section 22(f)
complements this protection by authorizing the funds and the SEC to deal more
flexibly with other detrimental trading practices by imposing SEC-approved re-
strictions on transferability and negotiability.
Id. at 2445.
92. 95 S. Ct. at 2436-38; see note 91 supra.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued by
it to any person except either to or through a principal underwriter for distribution
or at a current public offering price described in the prospectus, and, if such class
of security is being currently offered to the public by or through an underwriter,
no principal underwriter of such security, and no dealer shall sell any such security
to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at a
current public offering price described in the prospectus.
94. 95 S. Ct. at 2443.
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in this case also covered transactions by broker-dealers with other than
the investing public. The Court questioned whether the pricing agree-
ments to which broker-dealers were a party and which governed the
brokered transactions of these individuals were encompassed by section
22(d), thus qualifying for the antitrust exemption. 95
The NASD argued that the word "dealer" referred to an occupational
status. Because one individual may engage in both brokered and dealer
transactions in the securities market, the definition of dealer within
section 22(d) applied to all transactions engaged in by a broker-
dealer.96 In disposing of the appellee's claim the Court noted that the
Investment Act specifically defines "broker"97 and "dealer"9 8 and utiliz-
es the terms throughout the Act as they relate to the individual's role in
a particular transaction. The Court then held that the use of the word
"dealer" in the statutory provision referred to a transactional capacity.
Hence section 22(d) applied only to the dealer transactions of a broker-
dealer.99
The Court also gave considerable weight to SEC rulings interpreting
the statute'10 and adopted the Commission's position that Congress did
not intend section 22(d) to control "brokered" transactions. This nar-
row construction of the language of the provision was mandated by the
Court's policy disfavoring the granting of implied immunity. 10 The
Court concluded that to adopt the broad construction posited by the
appellees, would "not only displace the antitrust laws by implication [but]
it also would impinge seriously on the SEC's more flexible regulatory
authority under Section 22(f).,
95. Id. at 2440-41
96. Id. at 2441.
97. The Investment Act defines a "broker" as:
[A]ny person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others, but does not include a bank or any person solely by reason of
the fact that such person is an underwriter for one or more investment companies.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (6) (1970).
98. A "dealer" is defined as:
[A]ny person regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for
his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, insur-
ance company, or investment company, or any person insofar as he is engaged in
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities, for his own account, either individ-
ually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (11) (1970). For further distinctions between brokers and dealers
see, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c) (2), 10(b)(1), 17(e) (1), (2) (1970) (brokers); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-2(a) (40), 22(c), (d) (1970) (dealers).
99. 95 S. Ct. at 2442-43.
100. Id. at 2442.
101. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963); United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
102. Id. at 2443
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Failing to find immunity under section 22(d), the Court then consid-
ered whether the vertical restrictions were within the scope of section
22(f). 10 3 The Court found under this section that mutual fund compa-
nies have the power to limit the transferability of the securities they issue
subject only to the proviso that these limitations not conflict with SEC
rules and regulations. 10 4 It expressly rejected the argument of the United
States that section 22(f) authorized only restrictions appearing on the
face of the shares, 05 finding instead that section "22(f) specifically
recognizes that mutual funds can impose. . . restrictions on the dis-
tribution system."' 0 6 The Court concluded that the restrictive practices
were
immune from liability under the Sherman Act, for we see no way to
reconcile the Commission's power to authorize these restrictions with the
competing mandate of the antitrust laws.' 01
This conclusion was reached by the Court in spite of the fact that the
SEC had not exercised its power under section 22(f).108
As a second basis for implying repeal of the antitrust laws, the Court
noted that if the industry practices were to come within the scope of the
antitrust laws, there would be an unacceptable limitation on the invest-
ment industry's ability to reach the problems which the Investment Act
was designed to combat.'0 9 The congressional judgment embodied in
the Investment Act was that constraints on competition in the form of
resale price maintenance agreements and concerted refusals to deal were
unavoidable in dealing with the peculiar problems intrinsic to the mu-
tual fund industry. Consequently, Congress granted the SEC ultimate
authority in deciding to what degree, if any, such restrictions should be
endured "in the interest of the holders of all the outstanding securi-
ties"" 0 of mutual funds. Therefore, the Court held
103. Id. Section 22(f) of the Investment Act provides:
No registered open-end company shall restrict the transferability or negotiability of
any security of which it is the issuer except in conformity with the statements with
respect thereto contained in its registration statement nor in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests of the hold-
ers of all of the outstanding securities of such investment company.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970).
104. 95 S. Ct. at 2443.
105. Id. at 2444-45.
106. Id. at 2446.
107. Id. at 2444.
108. Id. at 2443-44. Although the SEC is empowered to prescribe rules governing the
transferability and negotiability of shares, at the time of the alleged conspiracy, they had
not done so. Appellants maintained that failure to exercise this aspect of the SEC's
authority precluded finding a "repugnancy between its regulatory authority and the
antitrust laws." Id. at 2444. However, the Court held that the SEC's actual exercise of its
power to authorize the restrictions was sufficient to create a repugnancy. Id.
109. See note 91 supra.
110. 15U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970).
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[tihere can be no reconciliation of [SEC's] authority under § 22(f)
to permit these and similar restrictive agreements with the Sherman
Act's declaration that they are illegal per se. In this instance the anti-
trust laws must give way if the regulatory scheme established by the In-
vestment Company Act is to work."1"
B. Horizontal Restrictions
After according the vertical restrictions immunity from the antitrust
laws, the Court then dealt with the more critical question of the legality
of the horizontal combination. As noted by the Court, these activities
were neither required by section 22(d) nor authorized by section
22(f).112 Consequently, implied immunity could not be predicated on
the same theories utilized for the vertical restrictions. It could not be
inferred that Congress by authorizing practices which were either neces-
sary to make the regulatory scheme work or which were directly in
conflict with the antitrust laws, intended to grant immunity." 3
Nonetheless, the Court found that the SEC was authorized under the
Maloney Act to review any and all rules of the NASD,"1 4 and held:
[T]he investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority in the SEC
suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban of the Sherman Act from
association activities approved by the SEC." 5
The importance of the Court's holding lies in the fact that a specific
congressional grant of jurisdiction to the SEC over a particular activity
was previously considered to be a prerequisite to the granting of anti-
trust immunity.116
It was this portion of the opinion for which the dissent reserved its
111. 95 S. Ct. at 2448.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970). In NASD, the Court specifically noted: 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b) (Supp. IV, 1975) (requiring
the SEC to determine whether an association has met several specific requirements to
qualify for registration as a national securities association); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (j) (1970)
(requiring registered associations to file with the Commission any proposed rule changes
for approval); and 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k) (2) (1970) (authorizing the SEC to request
changes in or supplements to association rules).
115. 95 S. Ct. at 2449. In exercising this broad
authority over association rules and practices, [the SEC] is charged with pro-
tection of the public interest as well as the interests of shareholders . . . and it re-
peatedly has indicated that it weighs competitive concerns in the exercise of its con-
tinued supervisory responsibility.
Id. (footnotes omitted). This supervisory authority extends to review of the rules as well
as the manner in which those rules are interpreted and implemented by the association
and its members. Id.
116. See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 358 n.12 (1963);pt. 1 supra.
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strongest criticism. Justice White expressed the fear that because of the
majority's holding,
implied antitrust immunity becomes the rule where a [regulatory]
agency has authority to approve business conduct whether or not the
agency is directed to consider antitrust factors in making its regulatory
decisions and whether or not there is other evidence that Congress in-
tended to displace judicial with administrative antitrust enforcement.
117
The actual consequence of NASD, -however, may not be to grant anti-
trust immunity to business conduct subject to regulatory agency approv-
al in all situations. Rather this immunity may be extended only so far as
to protect anticompetitive activity inherently related to other activities
which are immunized from antitrust liability by a pervasive statutory
scheme. 118 This conclusion is suggested by the holding of the Court that,
to the extent the horizontal combination activities were intended to
promote the vertical restriction activ.ities, the former were "ancillary" to
practices granted implied immunity 9 and, therefore, could be sheltered
by the same immunity110
[A]ppellant urges in Count I that appellees' ... [horizontal combina-
tion] was designed to encourage the suppression of intrafund secon-
dary market activities, precisely the restriction that the SEC consistently
has approved pursuant to §'22(f) for nearly 35 years. This close rela-
tionship is fatal to appellant's complaint, as the Commission's regulatory
approval of the... [vertical restrictions] cannot be reconciled with ap-
pellant's attack on the ancillary activities averred in Count J.121
Ultimately, the discrepancy between the majority and dissenting opin-
ions is narrowed to the question of how much evidence of legislative
intent is necessary to grant implied immunity. While the dissenting
Justices felt compelled to adhere strictly to the policy of disfavoring
immunity, the majority took a somewhat more pragmatic approach in
determining when repeal is "necessary to make the . . . [legislative
scheme] work. 122
117. 95 S. Ct. at2451.
118. Id. at 2450. It is unlikely that antitrust immunity based on other than the
existence of a pervasive regulatory scheme would protect "ancillary" activities. When
antitrust immunity is based on an express exemption or a clear repugnancy between the
regulatory statute and antitrust laws, the scope of the regulatory power may not be so
broad as to bring the "ancillary" activities within its confines.
119. See notes 93-111 supra and accompanying text.
120. 95 S. Ct. at 2449-50.
121. Id. at 2450.
122. Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). Subsequent to the decision in United
States v. NASD, the Second Circuit handed down its decision in Jacobi v. Bache & Co.,
520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975). This court also took a pragmatic approach in using the
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V. CONCLUSION
Gordon and NASD present a new and somewhat more expansive set
of criteria by which a regulated industry action may be found immune
from the antitrust laws. First, under Gordon, a congressional grant of
power to a regulatory agency to approve specific types of industry con-
duct coupled with an exercise of that power will lead to antitrust im-
munity. Second, under NASD, anticompetitive industry conduct not
specifically recognized by Congress in granting supervisorial power to
the regulatory agency will be given immunity if the "regulatory author-
ity. . . is sufficiently pervasive.' ' 3
Gordon leaves unanswered the question of what quantum of SEC
activity is necessary to support an implied repeal of the antitrust laws
in those cases where the existence of a pervasive regulatory scheme
is not asserted. In Gordon there was a continuing pattern of activity
over a considerable period of time to which the Court could look with
respect to the fixing of commission rates.12 4 In view of this fact, it may
be inferred that a high degree of active SEC review will be necessary.
This was the conclusion reached by Judge Friendly in Jacobi v. Bache
& Co.,125 in applying Gordon.
In the Jacobi case a NYSE rule imposed a service charge on transac-
tions of less than 1,000 shares.12 6 Registered representatives of member
firms challenged on antitrust grounds an Exchange article and rule
which prohibited the use of this service charge in the computation of the
commissions they earned from securities transactions. 27
The SEC had the authority, pursuant to SEC Rule 17a-8 (a), to
initially authorize the service charge,1as and later, by agreement with the
Exchange, to terminate its use. 29 The Commission conducted hearings
on the rule,'3 ' but never took any official action with regard to the
rule.' 3 ' In addition the court noted that the SEC could possibly have
"rule of reason" which "provides the 'breathing space' necessary for the process of
supervised self-regulation to work." Id. at 1239. See text accompanying note 133 infra.
123. 95 S. Ct. at 2448.
124. See note 72 supra.
125. 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975).
126. Id. at 1233. This rule was initially approved by the SEC for a 90 day period
commencing April 6, 1970. However, by a subsequent agreement between the NYSE and
the SEC, the rule could last indefinitely subject to SEC termination. Not until May 24,
1972, was the service charge eliminated. Id. at 1235-36.
127. Id. at 1236.
128. Id. at 1235.
129. See note 126 supra.
130. 520 F.2d at 1235-36.
131. Id. at 1236.
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taken action under section 19(b)(9) of the Act to request the Ex-
change to include the service charge as part of the registered representa-
tives' compensation base. 32
The court did not find implied repeal of the antitrust laws. 33 Distin-
guishing Gordon, the court relied on two factors: (1) "the Exchange's
authority to enforce" the prohibition against sharing the service charge
was not express as it was in Gordon; and (2) the SEC had failed to
exercise any power of review.'34 The court thus appears to interpret
Gordon as requiring an express statutory delegation by Congress of
power to regulate certain actions of the exchange and the SEC.
Gordon and NASD together may establish a singular test. Gordon
may serve as a partial answer to the dissent's fear in NASD that implied
antitrust immunity will flow from every statute giving a regulatory body
the power to "approve business conduct."' 35 This fear overstates to some
degree the probable impact of NASD. In the absence of regulatory
authority "ancillary" to a pervasive regulatory scheme, the courts will
most likely apply the Gordon standards. The practical effect of such an
application of these cases would be to establish a "shifting emphasis"
test. In order to obtain immunity (under this test) one would have to
show an increasing degree of specific legislative congressional recogni-
tion of the anticompetitive practice as the regulatory scheme became
less pervasive.
Whether NASD would mandate a similar result in other areas of the
securities market is open to question. Some commentators feel there are
significant differences between the Maloney Act and Investment
Act and the Securities Exchange Act. 30 These differences in the
provisions of the enabling statutes may lead to varying applica-
tions of the antitrust laws within the securities industry. What will
constitute sufficient SEC activity is an especially important question in
light of the new Securities Exchange Amendments of 1975.
On June 5, 1975, President Ford signed into law amended versions of
132. Id. at 1237.
133. Id. The opinion went on to state that where the NYSE is acting pursuant to its
self-regulatory function any otherwise per se antitrust violation must be measured under
a "rule of reason." Id. at 1238-39. Finding that the NYSE was acting reasonably in
prohibiting the sharing of the service charge in view of member firm's financial
situations, the antitrust challenge was dismissed. Id. at 1240.
134. Id. at 1237.
135. 95 S. Ct. at 2451.
136. Nerenberg, supra note 15, at 140-41; Note, Application of Antitrust Laws to the
Securities Industry, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 136, 142 (1968).
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.111 Under section 6(e), fixed
commission rates are prohibited.'"8 However, the SEC can provide for
fixed rates where it, rather than the individual exchanges, determines
that such fixed rates are in the public interest or are necessary to
accomplish the purposes of the Act and will not impose any unnecessary
burden on competition.' 39 Gordon would appear to allow such SEC
action antitrust immunity, especially in light of the SEC's duty to
consider these antitrust factors.
Another provision, section 19 (c), provides that:
The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add too, and delete from . . .
the rules of a self-regulatory organization. . . as the Commission deems
necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-reg-
ulatory organization, to conform its rules to the requirements of this
chapter .... 140
Moreover, under section 23(a)(2), the Commission, in making such
rules pursuant to this power, must consider the effect of such rules on
competition.'
4 '
137. Securities Exchange Act, § 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq. (Supp. IV, 1975),
formerly ch. 404, § 1 et seq., 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
138. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(e) (Supp. IV, 1975).
139. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(e) (Supp. IV, 1975) provides in part:
(1) . . . And provided further, that the commission, in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 78s(b) of this title as modified by the provisions of paragraph (4)
of this subsection, may-
(A) permit a national securities exchange, by rule, to impose a reasonable schedule
or fix reasonable rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be
charged by its members for effecting transactions on such exchange prior to Novem-
ber 1, 1976, if the Commission finds that such schedule or fixed rates of commis-
sions, allowances, discounts, or other fees are in the public interest; and (B) permit
a national securities exchange, by rule, to impose a schedule or fix rates of commis-
sions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged by its members for effecting
transactions on such exchange after November 1, 1976, if the Commission finds
that such schedule or fixed rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other
fees (i) are reasonable in relation to the costs of providing the service for which
such fees are charged (and the Commission publishes the standards employed in
adjudging reasonableness) and (ii) do not impose any burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter, taking into
consideration the competitive effects of permitting such schedule or fixed rates
weighed against the competitive effects of other lawful actions which the Commis-
sion is authorized to take under this chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 78s(c) [of this subehapter the Com-
mission may alter any] rule which imposes a schedule or fixes rates of commissions,
allowances, discounts, or other fees, if the Commission determines that such sched-
ule or fixed rates are no longer reasonable, in the public interest, or necessary to
accomplish the purposes of this chapter.
(4) (A) Before approving or disapproving any proposed rule change submitted by
a national securities exchange which would impose a schedule or fix rates of com-
missions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged by its members for ef-
fecting transactions on such exchange, the Commission shall afford interested per-
sons (i) an opportunity for oral presentation of data, views, and arguments. ...
140. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (Supp. IV, 1975).
141. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78w(a) (2) (Supp. IV, 1975) provides:
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It would thus appear that the SEC has authority with respect to all
exchange rules rather than just those which had been enumerated under
section 78s(b) prior to its amendment.14 Applying the analysis of
Gordon, it would appear that antitrust immunity would be afforded to
any exchange whose conduct fell within the ambit of any rule which the
SEC had actively supervised. This is strengthened by the fact that the
SEC must consider anticompetitive effects of such conduct before ap-
proving exchange registration under section 6(b)(8) and before direct-
ing an exchange to change its rules under section 23(a)(2). However,
this conclusion would appear to be inconsistent with a long line of cases
disfavoring implied repeal of the antitrust laws,143 the law of express
exemptions,' 44 and congressional intent that the new amendments would
not change the relationship between the antitrust and securities laws.' a
Gordon v. NYSE
by Albert S. Israel
Gary J. Singer
United States v. NASD
by Laurie Bernhard
Barbara Kheel
The Commission, in making rules and regulations pursuant to any provisions of
this chapter, shall consider among other matters the impact any such rule or regu-
lation would have on competition. The Commission shall not adopt any such rule
or regulation which would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appro-
priate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. The Commission shall include
in the statement of basis and purpose incorporated in any rule or regulation adopted
under this chapter, the reasons for the Commission's determination that any burden
on competition imposed by such rule or regulation is necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.
142. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s
(Supp. IV, 1975).
143. See note 26 supra.
144. See note 24 supra.
145. See SENATE Comm. ON BANKING, HousiNG AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES AcTs
AMENDMENTS OF 1975, REPORT TO AccomPANY S. 249, S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong.,
lst Sess. 14 (1975).
Furthermore, section 78s(d) (1) provides that notice will be filed with the SEC where
any self-regulatory organization (exchange) bars any nonmember from associating with
a member. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1975). And section 78s(d) (2) provides
that where notice is filed pursuant to (d) (1), the regulatory agency filing said notice will
be subject to direct review by the SEC either upon request of the regulatory agency
or the aggrieved person, member, participant, or applicant. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(d) (2)
(Supp. IV, 1975). Thus it would appear that the problem of procedural due process
which concerned the Court in Silver has now been alleviated. See note 23 supra.
